Abstract: This article looks at human trafficking from a perspective influenced by the 'vulnerability theory' developed by Martha Fineman and her associates. It draws particularly on empirical studies of human trafficking from Albania to the UK and elsewhere. It suggests that Fineman's approach needs to be modified to see the state not only as ameliorating vulnerability, or failing to do so, but as actively creating and using vulnerability to control or exploit its population. The fact that people are placed, for political, social and economic reasons, in situations of heightened vulnerability does not of itself deprive them of agency or responsibility. People should, however, be understood as 'vulnerable subjects' whose capacity for autonomy may be lost when they are deprived of supportive social relationships. The implications of this view for the criminal responsibility of trafficking victims are explored.
Introduction
In keeping with the theme of this issue, this article focusses on the trafficking of vulnerable adults; invulnerable adults, as well as children, are beyond its scope. But who are these invulnerable adults? To be human is to be vulnerable -to disease, cold, hunger, the disruption of social relationships on which we depend. As Martha Fineman, the most influential legal scholar of vulnerability puts it, vulnerability is 'the primary human condition'. 1 Clearly this special issue is not intended to be about adults in general, but about adults who are vulnerable in particular ways; but this, too, can be said of most if not all victims of trafficking. To be trafficked is to be transported (either between countries or within any country) with a view to exploitation, whether in the form of sexual exploitation, labour exploitation or the removal of organs.
2 While people will submit to exploitation for a variety of reasons (for example, are academics 'vulnerable' to working far longer hours than we are paid for?), the exploitation involved in many cases of human trafficking is so egregious that people would be unlikely to submit to it unless something in their situation made Border controls, however, are an important source of situational vulnerability. As a recent report by the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group (ATMG) argues:
a number of measures in the [Immigration Act 2016] increase vulnerability of migrants to exploitation, including:
• Measures making it illegal for those without status to rent accommodation;
• Measures creating criminal offences for landlords who 'know or have reasonable cause to believe tenants are disqualified from renting as a result of their immigration status;'
• New eviction powers to proprietors;
• A new offence of illegal working. 7 Moreover, as ATMG points out, rules tying overseas domestic workers to specific employers make then vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. The rise of homelessness, linked to austerity measures, 'has meant a rise in the number of people who are extremely vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation'; and a programme of returning trafficked migrants to their countries fails to address their vulnerability to re-trafficking. 8 The broader point made by the ATMG is that the causes of vulnerability are largely systemic, 9 and attributable in particular to the laws, policies and practices of states. We shall develop a similar argument in relation to one state which is perceived to be a major source of trafficking to the UK and has experienced widespread internal human trafficking, namely
Albania.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. First, we examine Fineman's approach to vulnerability and explain why we are adopting it only with some significant modifications.
We then turn to our case study of Albania, which can be seen both as a vulnerable state and one which produces situations of particular vulnerability to human trafficking. In light of this, we then look at the ethical and legal questions concerning the responsibilities of citizens, corporations of the state towards victims of trafficking, and the responsibility of victims of trafficking for offences they may commit as a result of their victimisation. The main point that emerges from the discussion of Albania is that the mere fact that people are in a vulnerable situation does not deprive them of agency or responsibility. Organised 7 Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group, Before the Harm is Done: Examining the UK's Response to the Prevention of Trafficking (ATMG: London, 2018) 43 (footnotes omitted). Available at: http://www.antislavery.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/Before-the-Harm-is-Done-report.pdf (accessed 22 October 2018). 8 Ibid. at 44-5, 47, 54. 9 Ibid. at 11.
crime may provide people with resources with which they attempt to reduce their vulnerability, but it may then place them in a situation in which any meaningful agency is lost. respond to the vulnerability of others in the same way. 24 We shall argue that this conception of a vulnerable subject helps to understand the legal position of victims of trafficking.
Others might prefer the more Levinasian approach of Judith Butler, according to which it is an ineluctable fact of moral experience 'that others make moral claims upon us…that we are not free to refuse'. 25 Either way, the primary obligation is one that each of us owes to our fellow humans in need, and any obligation laid on the state is derivative from this obligation. The question arises whether we can simply rely on the state to discharge this responsibility for us, particularly in the case of human trafficking where many individuals and corporations benefit from the exploitation of trafficked persons.
Vulnerability and trafficking: the Albanian case
To illustrate the relationship between vulnerability and human trafficking we draw on the literature about human trafficking within and from Albania. First, however, we must enter an important caveat: the current reality of human trafficking from Albania, in particular to the UK, is difficult to ascertain. Statistics from the National Referral Mechanism indicate that Albanians constitute a significant proportion of those referred to the NCA as being potential victims of trafficking. 26 We cannot, however, find any figures on how many of these cases receive a positive reasonable grounds (or conclusive grounds) decision from the Competent Authority indicating a probability that they actually are victims of trafficking. 27 Still less, of course, do we know how many of these decisions are correct -assuming that there is such a thing as an objectively correct decision to be made. There is, however, evidence from research studies to suggest that the level of human trafficking from Albania has declined substantially in recent years. 28 Much of the literature on Albanian organised crime dates from a decade or more ago and should not be taken as portraying the current situation. What it reveals about the situation in Albania between 1991 and c. 2008 nevertheless remains an interesting illustration of general issues about vulnerability, organised crime and the state.
A Vulnerable State?
From the perspective of vulnerability theory, institutions as well as states can be considered vulnerable. 29 The notion of institutional vulnerability has not been very precisely defined but we would suggest that it involves the risk to an institution of either losing the capacity to achieve its organisational goals, or being deflected from pursing them, for example, by corruption.
What is particularly significant in a state such as Albania is its vulnerability to losing capacity through infiltration by organised crime groups and the corruption of public officials. 30 Such corruption may cause a state to become 'fragile' and incapable of delivering crucial public goods such as safety, security and other basic services. 31 In such a situation, criminal enterprises are able, by the use of force, threats, and the corruption of public officials, to profit from illicit activities for which there may be great public demand. 32 The general population loses trust in the state's capacity to provide for its wellbeing 33 and the state may appear to working in favour of criminal networks 34 rather than protecting its citizens. In such fragile states, criminal groups can undertake different activities, such as human trafficking, and infiltrate into the legitimate economy through corruption of its agents. 35 In this sense, state institutions are particularly vulnerable to transnational organised crime (TOC). Jan van Dijk argues that one of the most important impacts of TOC on a state is the harm it does to the quality of its governance. 36 He states that by corrupting and otherwise compromising the integrity of public officials and institutions through corruption and threats, organised crime erodes the state's long-term capacity to provide for the common good. Where national and local authorities are incapable of delivering crucial public goods such as safety, security and other basic services, they face a loss of legitimacy that can endanger their ability to remain in power. 37 The combination of lack of capacity and lack of legitimacy is sometimes referred to as state 'fragility.' 38 TOC can infiltrate the structural composition of states, feeding on weaknesses and eventually heightening fragility, 39 which might be considered an extreme form of institutional vulnerability.
The problem with this language of 'fragility' and 'vulnerability' is that it assumes the state in question has a goal of delivering public goods but lacks the capacity to do so. Some states, however, are more aptly described as kleptocracies, 40 They took over prostitution markets in London, Amsterdam, Paris, Athens, Frankfurt, and other cities. 51 The money from prostitution was invested in Albania or re-invested in the criminal business itself.
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In 1997, Albania experienced a collapse of order and widespread violence, which resulted in a situation where the government was overthrown and some 2,000 people were killed.
The 1997 disorder came as a result of the collapse of fraudulent financial pyramid schemes. Albania's transitional period from communism to democracy, which began in 1990, led to the establishment of new structures for profiting from the country's resources. 53 As the pyramid schemes collapsed and many people lost their life savings, an opposition political party opened the prisons and released the inmates. and munitions were abandoned and could be taken freely. 54 The resulting situation is vividly described by Jusufi: which are qualitatively different from poverty', although they often overlap with it in practice. 57 The researchers argued that social exclusion and gender abuse were also major contributors to vulnerability. They wrote that vulnerable groups of these kinds were seen mostly in the cities and rural communities of the middle and coastal regions, where uncontrolled migration flows accelerated the breakdown of the traditional family structure in a context in which no mechanisms were in place to provide support and protection and women considered their circumstances intolerable. 58 John Davies, in a controversial study, 59 added that an increasing number of women were deliberately resorting to illegal migration and sex work to escape intolerable social traditions. between Brussels and England (which involved the smuggling or trafficking of people of many nationalities besides Albanians). 62 The problem of human trafficking has not been resolved but rather, as Limanowska explains, the traffickers became more professional and changed their modus operandi in response to counter trafficking measures. 63 Kevin Bales has argued that corruption is a driving factor of human trafficking. 64 Cho et have regularly helped falsify documents. 67 Leman and Janssens write that following the collapse of communism in 1991, some of the former Albanian security service or Sigurimi agents who lost their jobs when the agency was restructured (although former colleagues remained employed by the new security service) offered their services to criminal organisations. 68 Having joined criminal organisations which were active in human smuggling and trafficking, they brought typical intelligence techniques into the criminal network for internal secret communication. 69 They collaborated closely with corrupted border and visa control officials. 70 These former intelligence service members could also activate their contacts within Western embassies to obtain visas, and they facilitated the access to hotels or other places of stay for the temporary housing of people in transit. 71 In short, the Albanian state by a combination of corruption, economic mismanagement and a failure to respond to the needs of women, the Roma and other socially vulnerable groups, has done much to create and perpetuate conditions in which Albanians are vulnerable to human trafficking. How far this should be interpreted as a case of state vulnerability, as opposed to state institutions deliberately pursuing criminal objectives, is a difficult question.
Victims of Trafficking as Vulnerable Subjects
Little work has been done to apply vulnerability theory to crime, 72 and, in particular, to organised crime. We would suggest, however, that just as writers such as Diego Gambetta conceptualise organised crime as creating alternative sources of trust and protection where the state is weak, 73 organised crime can be understood as an alternative source of resilience, both for active participants and for those who use their services; but one which at the same time tends to create acute situational vulnerabilities. For example, in remote rural areas of Albania, and in marginalised urban areas, human trafficking has become a source of resilience for families and clans who exploit young women as sex workers. 74 Court case analysis by Tota and Mecka showed that traffickers in Albania often had family relations with the victim and relatives had supported trafficking out of economic necessity. 75 Leman and Janssens state that, in Albania, the entrepreneurial techniques for human trafficking networks remain clan-related with the potential use of violence and absolute control. 76 A perverted understanding of the Kanun (a mediaeval codification of Alba-nian customary law) has been used by Albanian traffickers to justify a complete devaluation of the position of women. 77 Women become economic assets; a source of resilience for the family or clan, but certainly not for themselves.
Other women, as well as men, turn to smugglers or traffickers in an attempt to achieve resilience by migrating. As discussed above, many Albanians and especially women have experienced acute vulnerability since the fall of communism, for reasons that include but are not reducible to severe poverty. Violation of women's labour and social rights and a wide gender wage gap also increased women's vulnerability. 78 Roma women and rural women have been considered especially vulnerable to trafficking. 79 When people facing acute situational vulnerability seek out the services of people smugglers, they are displaying a degree of resilience, 'bouncing back' from economic disaster and gender-based abuse. At the same time, they make themselves vulnerable to 'smugglers who turn out to be traffickers'. 80 In the words of the Upper Tribunal's Country Guidance:
Although such women cannot be said to have left Albania against their will, where they have fallen under the control of traffickers for the purpose of exploitation there is likely to be considerable violence within the relationships and a lack of freedom:
such women are victims of trafficking. 81 Acknowledging the initial resilience of many of those who become victims of trafficking runs counter to the dominant, gendered narrative of traffickers kidnapping, deceiving, exploiting, and sometimes enslaving naïve women. 82 It must be acknowledged, however, that for some Albanian women the dominant narrative is close to the truth. In one-third of the Belgian judicial files examined in Leman and Janssens' study of human smuggling and trafficking from Albania, via Belgium, to the UK, 'lover boy' techniques, where the victim is manipulated into seeing the perpetrator as her boyfriend, were used to lure young women into prostitution. Nevertheless, migrants who deliberately turn to those they take to be smugglers in order to reach the UK or another relatively wealthy country, in some cases with the intention of earning money by sex work, may be supposed to exercise a degree of rational agency at this initial stage, at least up to the point when the traffickers reveal their true colours.
84
This is consistent with the idea of a 'vulnerable subject', capable of exercising autonomy and agency but dependent for those capacities on the support of others, and so always vulnerable to betrayal. From the point of view of vulnerability theory we are all (at best) vulnerable subjects, but in our view some subjects, for social and economic reasons, are more vulnerable than others. The implications of such vulnerability for criminal responsibility will be discussed below.
Responsibility and Vulnerability
In this part of the article, we turn to discussion of the ethical and legal issues surrounding the responsibilities of the state and others towards victims of trafficking, and the responsibility of the victims for any offences they may commit at the instigation of their traffickers or exploiters. It may be helpful at this stage to summarise the relevant principles that emerge from the discussion so far.
(1) Vulnerability is a universal feature of the human condition and gives rise to an ethical responsibility to help others overcome their vulnerability, or at least a negative duty not to exploit the vulnerability of others. That responsibility can be justified along Kantian lines (as we prefer) or on the even more demanding lines of Levinasian ethics.
(2) The responsibilities of the state towards victims of trafficking are not duties towards its citizens, but rather duties owed by its citizens to humanity at large, which for practical reasons must be largely, but not entirely, delegated to the state. 83 Leman and Janssens, above n. 47at 173. (4) Individual characteristics such as disabilities may mean that a situation is one of heightened vulnerability for a person with those characteristics but would not be so (to the same degree) for others. Rather than regarding certain groups of people as vulnerable per se, we should consider the situations in which they would experience heightened vulnerability.
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(5) To alleviate their vulnerability people need resources for resilience (the capacity to recover from harms or setbacks) but they also need protection against situational vulnerability, i.e. against being exposed to heightened risks of harm. (The ability to escape from an existing situation of vulnerability can be considered as a form of resilience.) (6) People are responsible, i.e. answerable to public criticism, for wrongful acts committed when they had the capacity to recognise and respond to the reasons for acting otherwise than they did. 86 As vulnerable subjects, most of us have those capacities some of the time, but not throughout our lives.
In light of those principles, let us consider firstly the responsibility of the state, citizens and corporations towards victims of trafficking, and then the extent to which victims can justly be held responsible.
Responsibilisation and Preventive Strategies
According to Garland's notion of 'responsibilisation', 87 the burden of crime control is shared among participants 'making individuals, private sector and community responsible for public tasks' 88 and relieving the state of exclusive responsibility for crime control initiatives.
theory is conceived largely as an antidote to neoliberalism, 90 we might expect it to reject any kind of responsibilisation; but we would suggest that a more nuanced view is called for. What critics of responsibilisation usually object to is that it shifts responsibility onto vulnerable people themselves to provide their own means of resilience, for example by insurance. By stressing human interdependence in the face of universal vulnerability, the theory aims to provide a normative basis for a welfare state and welfare-oriented laws.
But this recognition of human interdependence can also support notions of responsible or active citizenship and social inclusion which are not far removed from the thinking associated with responsibilisation. 91 The second in our own list of six principles also points in this direction.
We can take an example from an article by Anita Heber which gives a critical account of the trend towards responsibilisation in Swedish anti-trafficking policy. She quotes the following statement from the Swedish government crime prevention agency, Brå:
Human trafficking is dependent on these legal actors, who are often unaware that they play roles that are important for organised crime. They include ferry companies, bus companies, travel agencies, restaurants, estate agents, housing agencies and landlords. By giving these groups knowledge about how they become involved in procuring and human trafficking, and how they are utilised without being aware of it, they may become more cautious and observant. This will prevent crime. 92 The problem with this statement, we would argue, is not with the idea that citizens and businesses could become more knowledgeable and observant, but that (according to Heber) the 'knowledge' on offer is seriously distorted, conflating sex trafficking (a relatively rare phenomenon in Sweden) with sex work in general, while paying little attention to trafficking for labour exploitation.
Situating modern slavery in the context of responsibilisation would favour strategies that 'decentre' criminal law enforcement in favour of a multi-agency regulatory approach. 93 There are undoubtedly good reasons to be suspicious of attempts to market this kind of multi-agency social control as 'progressive governance'. 94 The danger of this neo-liberal approach would be that it offers social inclusion to those who responsibly deal with social problems on the one hand and continued exclusion to those who seek or remain involved with human traffickers (or more generally, who choose to continue as sex workers) on the other. The outcome for those who do not responsibly 'exit' sex work involves further criminalisation and marginalisation. 95 Moreover the plight of victims of trafficking, coupled with conflation of trafficking with migration and sex work, 96 provide a convenient rationale for increasingly coercive control of both migration and sex work in general.
In contrast, an approach which stressed the responsibility of corporations and consumers to avoid benefitting, knowingly or unwittingly, from trafficking for labour exploitation, either internationally or within the UK, could be genuinely progressive. In this respect the duty of firms with a turnover over £36 million per annum to publish a slavery and human trafficking statement to ensure that modern slavery is not involved in their supply chains 97 is a small but welcome step in the right direction. Another is the 'safe car wash app' which enables car wash customers to complete a short survey on working conditions.
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Criminal Responsibility and Defences
We turn now to the question of how far people classed as victims of human trafficking can be held responsible for any offences they commit. Under the Modern Slavery Act 2015, s.
45, an adult who acted under compulsion attributable to slavery or to exploitation consequent on being a victim of trafficking will have a defence to some charges (subject to long and somewhat arbitrary list of exclusions), 99 'if a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person's relevant characteristics would have no realistic alternative to doing that act'. 100 In the case of a defendant under 18, the word 'compulsion'
is not used and the test is one of whether a reasonable person in the same situation and with the same relevant characteristics would do the act. 101 Compared to the defence of fragility of human autonomy unless it is manifested in a medically diagnosable condition that will constitute a 'relevant characteristic' of the defendant. 102 As Karl Laird argues, it seemingly 'requires a victim of slavery or relevant exploitation to be evaluated against a standard they could not possibly have been expected to achieve'. 103 A more appropriate test, in line with our focus in principle (6) above on the defendant's ability to recognise and respond to reasons for acting otherwise, might be whether the defendant was unable, as a result of slavery of exploitation, to see any reasonable alternative to acting as they did. A vulnerability-focused approach would concur with Laird's call 'to construct a more humanising defence', 104 and give the vague word 'humanising' a particular meaning: that the defence should reflect an understanding of human beings as vulnerable subjects, rather than the abstract individuals of traditional criminal law doctrine.
As we hope the preceding discussion has made clear, this is not to endorse the stereotype of trafficked persons as passive victims entirely lacking in agency. In relation to Albania, we suggested that when people in a highly vulnerable situation turn to smugglers for help with migration, possibly with the intention of engaging in sex work, this may at least initially constitute a form of resilience, a way of seeking control over one's life and escaping from extreme poverty, gender-based violence and other hardships. When the smugglers turn out to be traffickers, however, the migrant may be faced with such levels of coercion and manipulation that they lose any meaningful degree of autonomy. Such cases raise a thorny question in the theory and doctrine of criminal law: the extent to which people can be held responsible for bringing about their own lack of responsibility. 105 The law gives different answers to these questions depending on whether a defendant can benefit from the specific defence under the Modern Slavery Act 2015, s. 45, or whether they have to rely on the common law of duress or abuse of process. The latter will apply if either the offence is one of those listed in Schedule 4 of the Act, to which the statutory offence does not apply (e.g. manslaughter, 106 burglary or assisting illegal immigration), or it was committed before s. 45 came into force. The law is not concerned with whether a person in a positon of such extreme vulnerability is somehow to blame for being in that situation.
It is otherwise where the defendant relies on the common law, as can be seen in the recent case of R v GS. 107 The appellant was a drugs 'mule' arrested and convicted in 2007. In 2015 she was granted asylum on the basis that she was a victim of trafficking and that her life would be in danger if she was sent back to Jamaica. The Competent Authority accepted that, on the balance of probabilities, she was a victim of trafficking for the purposes of forced criminality. However, her status as a refugee and her leave to remain in the UK would be at risk unless her conviction was overturned. 108 She relied on reports from two psychologists to the effect that she had suffered cognitive impairment as a result of head injuries and her 'vulnerable personality', coupled with her lowered intellect, accounted 'for her lack of judgment and acquiescence in being manipulated into committing the offence'.
The Applicant was of 'borderline intelligence' and 'overly compliant'. She had been traumatised by her experiences; her lowered intellect and 'current emotional state' made her 'vulnerable to exploitation by her more able peers'. 109 Her appeal was on the basis that the law had developed since 2007 to the point where it would be considered an abuse of process to prosecute a victim of trafficking in her situation, and given the risk to her immigration status there would be 'substantial injustice' if the decision were allowed to stand.
The Court of Appeal considered the case under the law of abuse of process as it had developed since 2008, not under s. 45 of the 2015 Act. 110 It concluded that the psychological evidence would be largely inadmissible at trial, 111 and that the applicant was not under such a level of compulsion that it was not in the public interest for her to be prosecuted. In reaching the latter decision, the Court attached great weight to the fact that, cognisant of the risk, she returned to the UK and resumed contact with those whom she knew were involved in the drugs trade. That there were or may have been health issues prompting her return to the UK does not bear on the resumption of contact with those who had, on her own account, already trafficked her to the Bahamas.
Applying the principles outlined above, both aspects of the Court of Appeal decision are questionable. In relation to admissibility, the Court seems to have asked itself the wrong question, namely whether or not the expert evidence would have been admissible in relation to the defence of duress that GS raised at trial. It is unclear whether the Court answered this question correctly, as the evidence was arguably inadmissible in so far as it suggested a link between GS's psychological compliance and her brain injury. 113 The real issue is how far the prosecution would have been obliged to consider the psychologists' reports in exercising its discretion whether to prosecute in circumstances where the victim had been compelled to participate in crime even if the defence of duress was unavailable. 114 The medical evidence was relevant to the question whether the crime had in fact been committed under compulsion not amounting to duress, so that it ought not to be prosecuted in light of the Council of Europe Convention Against Trafficking in Human Beings, Art. 26. To answer that question requires an understanding of the interaction between the individual's characteristics (including brain injury) and her situational vulnerability, and a psychological report may help to illuminate that difficult issue.
The ruling on abuse of process adopts a 'reasonable person' approach that ignores the fragility of human autonomy and prioritises punishment over compassion for human vulnerability. It is understandable that the House of Lords in Hasan 115 should wish to deny a defence of duress to someone who had apparently chosen a career within the illegal economy where it was predictable that his employers would use harsh measures to enforce their orders. As Baroness Hale said in that case, however, It is one thing to deny the defence to people who choose to become members of illegal organisations, join criminal gangs, or engage with others in drug-related criminality. It is another thing to deny it to someone who has a quite different reason for becoming associated with the duressor and then finds it difficult to escape.
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In GS, the applicant's motives for renewing contact with her traffickers are unclear, but there is no indication it was with intention of becoming involved in criminality. If she merely showed poor judgement, she had already paid a heavy price without being criminally punished. Typically victims of trafficking will fall into the second category described [78] .
Modern Slavery Act on the grounds of voluntary association with a person from whom some form of compulsion was foreseeable.
Conclusion
We have used the example of human trafficking to explore the possible value of a form of vulnerability theory to criminal law. We have taken Martha Fineman's influential theory as a starting point but have modified it in two respects. First, in common with Jonathan
Herring, 117 we take account of situational vulnerability as well as universal vulnerability.
In this way we can avoid pathologising 'vulnerable adults' as a category of defective beings without embracing the strikingly counter-intuitive claim that all human beings are equally vulnerable all of the time, even if that vulnerability manifests itself in different ways. An exponent of vulnerability theory orthodoxy might respond that it is precisely this counterintuitive view that gives the theory its heuristic power, 118 but we are not convinced. Secondly, we adhere to a modified version of the Kantian idea of moral autonomy (though perhaps not very much modified, given careful attention to the nuances of Kant's texts), 119 in which moral autonomy is regarded as a fragile condition which human beings can attain only intermittently and with the support of others.
Vulnerability theory offers both a social analysis of law and an ethical framework.
Ethical conclusions cannot be straightforwardly read off from the social analysis, but it is important to stress that the theory does not imply that because people are vulnerable they 117 Herring, above, n. 4. 118 We took this to be the view of several participants at the Leeds workshop, above n. 13. 119 Formosa, above n. 24.
